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I6ss to the plaintiff, to which loss the
plaintiff had not in any way contributed
by any negligence or any unlawful act
on his part. It would thus seem that
according to all usual and ordinary rules
the plaintiff ought to have had a verdict for
the loss caused by the fall of the wall. The
ground of the decision in this case seems
to have been, although not clearly expressed, that the act of the defendant
was not unlawful because it was not
actionable. But this is not correct in a
case like the present. There may be
cases in which an unlawful act does not
give any right of action unless it causes
damage. In fact, in all actions on the
case damage is the ground of the actionsometimes damage is presumed by the
law, sometimes it is not: in the latter
class of cases, therefore, actual damage
must be proved to entitle the plaintiff to
bring an action; for instance, if a servant driving a wagon comes into collision with another wagon by his negligent
driving, his master will be liable in an
action if damage capable of being estimated has been caused by his servant's
carelessness; but if no actual damage
has been caused the master is not liable
to an action at all, even to recover
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nominal damages. In the latter case
the owner of the wagon driven against
by the servant has no right of action at
all. In both these instances wvehave
put, the act of the servant would be
equally unlawful, and might in each
case be done in precisely the same manner, and yet, in consequence perhaps of
the nature of the load in the wagon of
the plaintiff, might produce an entirely
different result. A collision with a
wagon loaded with cases full of china
would be more likely to cause damage
than a collision with an empty one ; and
-this difference in the result of the collision causing the damage would be occasioned entirely by the act of the plaintiff
in loading his wagon with goods of a
particular sort. The action: in the principal case was an action on the case,
and as such ought, it would seem, to
have been subject to precisely the same
rules as other actions of the same nature.
A distinction has, however, been drawn
by this decision between an action on
the case for taking away the support of
land and other actions of the same class,
and it is for this reason that this case is
deserving of attentive consideration,Solicitors' Journal.
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SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.'
CONTRACT.

Commissions.-The plaintiff effected a sale of certain real estate for
MI.for $22,000, under a previous -agreement with bl. to pay the plaintiff ten per cent, of the amount for which the property should be sold.
31. received in part payment another piece of real estate at $7525,
which was worth at the time but $4220. Field, that the plaintiff is
entitled to ten per cent. of the real price for which the property was
sold, and not of a fictitious pfice, or a price that in the trade was reI From W. G. Veazey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 38 Vermont Reports.
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garded by the parties as fictitious: Wakefield v. Estate of MAerrick,
38 Vt.
But in determining.whether the price named in the contract was real
or fictitious, it must be considered how the parties regarded the property received in part payment in reference to its value. If the parties
to the contract fixed upon the sum of $7525, as the price they judged
it worth, that sum must be the guide, although in fact it was of less
value; or if the plaintiff and i. judged it worth that price the result
is the same: Id.
It appeared that pending the negotiation M. went with the plaintiff
and examined the real estate that he received in part payment, and
agreed on the price at which it was taken; but the auditor did not find
that they judged thb property worth less than the agreed price. Held,
that in the absence of such finding the court are not at liberty to infer
it merely from the fact that it was worth less: Id.
DEED.

Way.-There was a grant in the deed in question of a " common
passway for all necessary and household purposes" to the rear of the
building conveyed, of the width of a "common cartway." It appeared
in proof that an ordinary cartway is of the width of only twelve feet.
Held, that the grantee is not necessarily restricted to a passway twelve
feet in width only: Walker v. Pierce, 38 Vt.
It is a question of fact whether the grantee has such convenient
space left open and unobstructed for the purposes specified in the
deed: Id.
Where a party grants a private way, he is not bound by implication
to construct or keep it in repair: Id.
The parties to this bill owned a right of way in common with A.,
which the defendant had graded, to the orator's prejudice. Reld, that
a decree may properly be made for the defendant in effect to undo what
he has improperly done, without making A. a party: Id.
INFANT.

Contract in'Ilfant's Name by his Father.-The defendant, Hiram
Hill, put in a bid to the Post Office Department for a mail route in the
name and in behalf of his minor son, Robert H. Hill, which was accepted
on the defendant's personal guaranty. Said Robert was to enter upon
his contract July 1st, but did not appear and carry the mail on that
day, and after that the defendant procured it to be carried while said
Robert held the contract. July 8th the plaintiff Putnam went to
Washington to get the contract annulled on the ground of the failure
of said Robert to carry the mail the first day of July, and to obtain it
ibr himself, and on the 10th succeeded in his mission; and on the same
day the plaintiff Thompson, having no confidence in Putnam's success
in Washington, purchased of the defendant the said Robert's contract
for $200 bonus, and received of the defendant a paper signed "Robert
H. Hill," requesting the department to transfer or issue the contract
to the plaintiffs. At the time of the trade Thompson supposed, and
the defendant gave him to understand, that he, the defendant, was
Robert H. Hill, the person by whom and in whose name the bid was
made, and the defendant designedly concealed from Thompson the fact

